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ABSTRACT 
Protection Motivation Theory, which models the appraisal processes individuals make in 
regard to potential threats and safeguards, has informed a number of previous empirical studies 
on information security.  However, none have accounted for the possibility of multiple 
countermeasures.  In this study, we investigated this possibility by analyzing the responses of 
computer users who could potentially suffer malware infections.  Initial results suggest that high 
levels of self-efficacy and low levels of response costs motivate the intentions to adopt one 
countermeasure over another. 
 





Individuals and organizations deal with an enormous amount of information on a daily 
basis. Much of this information needs to be secured from potential intruders. As a measure of 
ensuring information security, it is imperative for individuals and organizations to consider 
available countermeasures to help protect their secure information from unauthorized access. 
Previous studies in the area of information security have adopted the Protection Motivation 
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Theory (PMT) as a means predicting an individual’s behavioral intention to protect oneself 
against malware, viruses, hacking, insider threat, social engineering, and password compromise, 
among other threats to information (Herath and Rao 2009; Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Marett 
et al. 2011). Generally speaking, PMT explains how the perceptual variables of threat severity, 
threat vulnerability, self-efficacy, response efficacy and response cost influence an individual’s 
intention to adopt a certain response or countermeasure.  
PMT models two sequential cognitive processes, a threat appraisal and a coping 
appraisal, as having an influence on behavioral intent. In the first process, the threat appraisal, 
the perceived severity and vulnerability associated with the threat are hypothesized to have a 
positive relationship with behavioral intention, with the perceived rewards associated with 
continuing one’s risky behavior negating some of that relationship. The current study focuses on 
the second process, the coping appraisal, which focuses on the methods by which the individual 
may counter the threat. PMT theorizes that individuals appraise the response efficacy of a 
countermeasure and their own self-efficacy in successfully implementing it, both of which are 
expected to positively influence behavioral intent. Coping appraisals also include the influence 
of the perceived response costs associated with the countermeasure, which are expected to 
negatively influence behavioral intent.  
For each potential threat to one’s security and privacy, the threat appraisal process is 
likely conducted once at that time. However, there may be multiple possible countermeasures to 
the threat, which suggests that individuals could undertake the coping appraisal process multiple 
times before deciding on a course of action. To our knowledge, this has seldom been 
acknowledged in previous PMT research, especially those in the field of information security. 
Thus, the research questions of this study are (a) do individuals differentiate between multiple 
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countermeasures when engaging in protection motivation, and (b) how does this differentiation 
affect behavioral intentions to protect oneself?  
THEORY REVIEW 
PMT was developed by Rogers (1975) to help explain the cognitive processes people use 
when appraising risks to their health (Floyd et al. 2000). As described earlier, PMT consists of 
two main components, the threat appraisal and coping appraisal. The threat appraisal process is 
initiated first since an individual needs to recognize the threat prior to assessing the coping 
behaviors. Perceived threat severity is the belief of the significance or the magnitude of the threat 
whereas perceived threat vulnerability is an individual’s belief of the probability of experiencing 
a certain threat (Ifinedo 2012). Rewards include the extrinsic and intrinsic benefits gained by an 
individual for not following the recommended response. The threat appraisal process is triggered 
by the realization of an external influence associated with the individual’s behavior that is 
potentially a source of negative consequences.  
Should the individual determine the threat can cause a degree of harm that the individual 
seeks means of protection against it, the coping appraisal process is initiated. Self-efficacy is an 
individual’s belief that s/he will be able to carry out the recommended response by themselves 
whereas response efficacy is the belief that a particular response is adequate in protecting oneself 
(Floyd et al. 2000). Response costs are any related costs in carrying out the recommended 
response. Taken together, protection motivation involves any threat for which there is an 
effective recommended response that can be carried out by the individual. For example, for a 
threat of lung cancer due to smoking, a recommended response is to quit smoking, and to guard  
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against the threat of injury from a car crash, a recommended response would be to wear a seat 
belt. In terms of information security, the threat of computer virus infection has a recommended 
response to install anti-virus software, and for a threat of unexpected data loss, a recommended 
response would be to frequently back up data. 
Much of the extant literature on protection motivation has paired a specific threat with 
one recommended response, but conceivably, there could be multiple effective responses. 
Studies that have acknowledged this possibility are few and far between. In his meta-analysis of 
PMT studies in the health communication field, Floyd et al. (2000) indicates that a limited 
number of studies have offered a variety of different recommended responses for a given threat, 
but when they have, the coping appraisal variables have been observed to influence the choice of 
response. For instance, participants considering the threat of skin cancer indicated that 
completely staying out of the sun has a greater response cost than using sunscreen, and was thus 
the less popular option (Jones and Leary 1994). Similarly, people in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Lili were found to differ in their action plans for future storms based on the relative response 
costs of preparation and implementation (Kang et al. 2007). Research on the consequences of 
binge drinking suggests that, when identifying multiple strategies to avoid negative 
consequences, individuals choose the strategy that has personally been most effective for 
managing risks in the past (i.e., response efficacy) (Wolburg 2001). Whether these coping 
appraisal variables influence which among multiple countermeasures chosen by individuals 
considering a threat to information security remains to be seen.  
Self-Efficacy 
Within the context of protection motivation, self-efficacy is the belief of an individual on 
his or her own ability to carry out a recommended response and successfully avert a threat 
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(Milne et al. 2000). A person’s self-efficacy has been speculated as being a source of motivation 
to more frequently and more persistently engage in implementing information security coping 
responses (Rhee et al. 2009). A number of PMT studies focusing on intentions to adopt better 
security behaviors and countermeasures have found a strong positive relationship between self-
efficacy and behavioral intentions (Gurung et al. 2009; Ifinedo 2012; Johnston et al. 2010; Lee 
2011). However, we expect that, when comparing possible responses, an individual will be more 
likely to adopt the recommended response he or she feels more confident in his or her ability to 
implement it. Therefore:  
H1: Given multiple responses for protecting against a threat to information security, individuals 
will intend to adopt the response or responses with higher perceived self-efficacy.  
Response Efficacy 
Response efficacy is an individual’s assessment of the chance a recommended response 
will be effective in averting the specific threat or danger (Milne et al. 2000). When an individual 
feels that a specific response will be effective in reducing the threat, the likelihood of the 
individual to adopt the recommended response will increase. The choice of a response that 
appears to have a greater chance for success could be a question of resource allocation (Herath et 
al. 2009) in that individuals assessing a significant threat will tend to choose a “sure thing” over 
an untested alternative if there is no slack time or resources to absorb a failure. Perceived 
response efficacy has been consistently found to be a significant positive influence on behavioral 
intentions (Johnston et al. 2010). Therefore we hypothesize that:  
H2: Given multiple responses for protecting against a threat to information security, individuals 
will intend to adopt the response or responses with higher perceived response efficacy.  
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Response costs refer to any cost such as time, money, effort incurred due to carrying out 
a recommended response (Floyd 2000; Milne et al. 2000). Should an individual perceive the cost 
of a response to be higher than the benefits it provides or than the cost caused by the threat being 
realized, the individual is less likely to adopt that response. In terms of information security 
behaviors, the role of response costs toward implementing less risky security controls has been 
mixed. In some studies, individuals were influenced to adopt a behavior or countermeasure based 
on the costs they expected to incur (Hu and Dinev 2005; Workman et al. 2008), while other 
studies did not find response cost to significantly influence behavioral intentions (Gurung et al. 
2009; Lee and Kozar 2005). In some cases, the measure for response costs could have been 
inadvertently assessed the perceived ease of use (i.e. “I am able to implement this control 
without much trouble”), which would likely confound with the measure for self-efficacy 
(Chenoweth et al. 2009). In other studies, assessing response costs has been more likely to 
produce maladaptive behaviors (avoidance or hopelessness) than the adoption of a secure 
behavior (Marett et al. 2011). In the present study, given a set of recommended responses, 
response cost will negatively influence the end user in adopting a recommended response. 
Therefore:  
H3: Given multiple responses for protecting against a threat to information security, 
individuals will intend to adopt the response or responses with lower perceived response costs. 
METHOD 
An online survey was administered to the undergraduate and graduate students in the 
college of business at a southern university and their acquaintances via “snowball sampling” 
where the study participants were requested to recruit additional participants for the study.  
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Participants appraised the threat of malware, which was defined for them as “malicious software 
programmed to access a computer system without the authorization of its owner” and includes 
computer viruses, spyware, and Trojan horses (Malimage and Warkentin 2011). In addition to 
being a concept most Internet users are aware of, malware has been observed as a serious threat 
in previous PMT research, with individuals eagerly seeking out methods by which to reduce its 
likelihood (Lee and Larsen 2009). Three countermeasures were provided as ways to cope with 
the threat: users should keep virus detection software updated, users should enable firewalls on 
their computer, and users should avoid visiting suspicious or untrusted websites. These 
countermeasures have been used in PMT studies and have been recommended as safeguards by 
major software developers and universities2. In terms of the response costs placed on the average 
Internet user, keeping virus detection definitions current was expected to be the most demanding 
response, followed by enabling firewalls and then by avoiding suspicious websites (Stafford and 
Poston 2010). The survey effort produced 146 usable responses. The average age of respondents 
was 21.8 years and the sample was 50.3 percent female.  There was no attempt made to identify 
the setting (work, home, etc.) in which the respondent’s computer resides nor the operating 
system and its inherent vulnerabilities installed on the computer. 
All items in the instrument (see Table 1) were adopted from previously developed scales 
and passed an expert panel review. Respondents were requested to rate the level of severity and 
vulnerability for the threat of malware infection. The respondents were then presented with the 
three recommended responses (in random order) accompanied by items measuring the 
individual’s perceived self-efficacy, response efficacy and response costs for each. Survey 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The three recommended responses for preventing malware infection are listed on the help reference websites for 
both Apple and Microsoft, as well as on the helpdesk websites for Cornell University, Mississippi State University, 
and Texas A&M University.	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respondents did consider the threat of malware to be severe (M=3.72 on 5-point scale) and 
considered themselves above average in vulnerability (M=3.04). 
Table 1. Items for PMT Measures. 
Measure  Item  
Threat Severity  
(Johnston et al. 2010)  
1) If my computer were infected by malware, it would be 
significant.  
2) If my computer were infected by malware, it would be 
severe.  
3) If my computer were infected by malware, it would be 
serious.  
Threat Vulnerability  
(Johnston et al. 2010)  
1) It is possible that my computer will become infected with 
malware.  
2) It is likely that my computer will become infected with 
malware.  
3) My computer is at risk for becoming infected with 
malware.  
Self Efficacy  
(Gurung et al. 2009)  
1) I have the skills to install a personal firewall.  
2) I am able to install a personal firewall.  
3) I am capable of installing a personal firewall.  
Response Efficacy  
(Lee 2011)  
1) A personal firewall is effective for protection against 
malware.  
2) Malware can be prevented by using a personal firewall.  
3) A personal firewall works for protection against 
malware.  
Response Costs  
(Workman et al. 2008)  
1) It is inconvenient to install a personal firewall.  
2) It is time consuming to install a personal firewall.  
3) It is troublesome to install a personal firewall.  
Behavioral Intent to Adopt 
Response  
(Johnston et al. 2010)  
1) I intend to install a personal firewall in the near future.  
2) I plan to install a personal firewall in the near future.  




Before conducting the main data analysis, we performed a confirmatory factor analysis 
for the items and measures derived from PMT, and found that all of the modeled items loaded 
most strongly on their associated measure. We then assessed the reliability and discriminant 
validity of the measures. Reliabilities were assessed using Cronbach’s Alpha, and each of the 
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measures were found to surpass the recommended value of 0.7. Finally, we determined that the 
measures demonstrated discriminant validity by comparing the square root of the average 
variance extracted with the inter-construct correlations for each. In the cases of the behavioral 
intent, response and self efficacy, and response cost measures, the reliability and validity checks 
were performed separately for each of the three responses. 
Table 2. Results of Paired Sample T-tests. Means (Standard Deviations). 
 Anti-Virus 
Software (AV)  
Personal 
Firewall (PW)  
Avoid Untrusted 
Websites (UW)  
Significant 
Differences  




3.98 (0.6) 3.94 (0.6) 3.97 (0.8) all n.s. 
Response 
Costs  2.93 (1.0) 2.69 (0.8) 2.56 (0.8) 
AV – UW ** 




3.64 (0.9) 3.82 (0.8) 4.13 (0.7) all ** 
NOTE:  ** p<.01, * p<.05, n.s. = not significant  
 
We first tested the hypotheses using paired sample comparisons of the coping appraisal 
variables across the three responses, the results of which can be found in Table 2. The goal of 
this analysis was to confirm that the three recommended responses could be differentiated by 
computer users. Respondents perceived the option to avoid untrusted websites differently in 
terms of self-efficacy, they reported significant differences in response costs for updating anti-
virus software, and BI to adopt was significant between all three responses, which suggests that 
the responses could be appraised differently. The most likely response to be adopted was 
avoiding untrusted websites, and it was rated the highest in perceived self-efficacy and lowest in 
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response costs, supporting Hypotheses 1 and 3. There was no significant difference in response 
efficacy between the three responses, effectively voiding Hypothesis 2.  
We next determined the influence of the two appraisal processes on the behavioral 
intentions to adopt each of the three responses. This was performed through hierarchical linear 
regression analyses, which has been used in previous PMT studies to account for the time order 
of the appraisal processes (Grothmann and Reusswig 2006; Marett et al. 2011). The first 
regression model included the threat appraisal variables, and the second model added the coping 
appraisal variables. The results of these regression analyses can be found in Table 3. 
Table 3. Results of Hierarchical Regression. Standardized Betas Displayed. 
Dependent Variable: 





















.06            
 
-.03        
.18** 
 
.39**            .12 






















                       .38** 
                       .37** 
                       -.09 
R2 
Adjusted R2 














EV = Expected Valence. ** p< .01, * p< .05  
 
DISCUSSION 
The main focus of this study was to examine the coping appraisal process undertaken by 
computer users who are advised to choose among multiple countermeasures to better protect 
oneself from a threat to their security. Although the possibility of multiple responses seems to 
exist with most security threats, it has yet to be accounted for in the IS security literature. Among 
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our findings, high levels of self-efficacy and low levels of response costs were associated with 
the countermeasure most intended to be adopted. Further, the increase in variance explained by 
the coping appraisal alone suggests that, when multiple countermeasures are under consideration, 
the coping variables (particularly, self-efficacy and response efficacy) were more influential 
toward the decision to adopt than those for the threat appraisal. In all, our results suggest that, 
when faced with multiple protective responses, the coping appraisal may take a more prominent 
role in decision-making than previous research has indicated, and coping variables like self-
efficacy and response costs may influence a user’s choice of response should each be perceived 
as being equally effective.  
Our results also suggest that a user’s perception of response costs should be better 
acknowledged in future information security studies informed by PMT. Increased security 
typically comes at the sacrifice of convenience, and any perceived hindrance can be reason 
enough for users to fail to comply with existing security policies (Herath et al. 2009), much less 
for adopting new countermeasures. However, future research is needed to determine to what 
extent a protective action is taken and whether the perceived costs involved take a different role 
over the long term (Grothmann et al. 2006). Here, the act of avoiding untrusted websites was 
reportedly the least costly response, but the choice to browse risky websites could be a more 
situational decision than the other two responses in this study and, thus, cause an individual to re-
evaluate the protective behavior.  
The results should be interpreted with the following limitations in mind. First, we 
selected one specific threat to information security and three specific responses to examine. We 
hesitate to presume that a different threat or other responses would produce the same appraisal. 
We also did not provide a fear appeal to serve as a catalyst for the threat appraisal process, so 
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whatever perceived severity of or vulnerability to malware was reported by our respondents was 
likely a product of their own previous experience. Also, the survey respondents were mostly 
college students, but the snowball sampling method attempted to extend beyond that group of 
individuals. Nonetheless, all of the respondents reported using a computer over five hours a 
week. Thus, the threat of malware was salient to the sample.  
A key component to rational decision-making is the process of identifying all reasonable 
alternatives and appraising each for their suitability. This study is a first step in taking that 
concept and applying it to the context of protection motivation. Information security practitioners 
must acknowledge that users may instead satisfice and choose the easiest, least costly solution. In 
these cases, we must attempt to make effective responses readily available.  
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